Monday, May 26, 2014

5. The Muslim Brotherhood in North America (Front Organizations, Policy of Denial)

14.  Front Organizations: Policy and Practice

In order to work towards its goal, the Muslim Brotherhood in North America has identified that it will require multiple organizations carrying out different tasks.  These tasks are many and varied including creating a series of organizations to carry out this work.  In the 1991 An Explanatory Memorandum on the General Strategic Goal for the Group in North America, the following views on organizations are offered:
We must say that we are in a country which understands no language other than the language of the organizations, and one which does not respect or give weight to any group without effective, functional and strong organizations.
I say to my brothers, let us raise the banner of truth to establish right "We want to establish the Group of organizations", as without it we will not able to put our feet on the true path.”
And this was done by the pioneer of the contemporary Islamic Dawa', Imam martyr Hasan al-Banna, may God have mercy on him, when he and his brothers felt the need to re-establish" Islam and its movement anew, leading him to establish organizations with all their kinds: economic, social, media, scouting, professional and even the military ones. [i]

These views on the creation of organizations seem remarkably similar to the views expressed earlier in a 1981 document from the Muslim Brotherhood titled simply “The Project.”  In this 1981 document describing an overall international strategy for the movement, the following observations and requirements are noted:
To create a certain number of economic, social, health care and educational institutions, using available means, to serve the people within an Islamic framework.

Create centers of study and research and produce studies on the political dimension of the Islamic movement.

To create an effective and serious media centre.

Create observation centers in order to gather and store information for all useful purposes, if need be relying on modern technological methods.

Point of Departure 5: To be used to establish an Islamic State; parallel, progressive efforts targeted at controlling the local centers of power through institutional action.[ii]

In addition to these views, senior officials in the Muslim Brotherhood have identified that they will require a number of front organizations.  A variety of senior officials from the Muslim Brotherhood have openly talked of the need for fronts and about the need, at times, for secrecy.  The issue of military training in Muslim Brotherhood camps also comes up on numerous occasions in this same context. 
Zeid al Noman, (also reported as Zaid Naman) is a senior figure in the Muslim Brotherhood in North America.  In a 1981 speech he was introduced as a Masul of the Executive Office of the Muslim Brotherhood in America.[iii]  In a 1992 document, he was identified as being on the Shura Council (board of directors) of the same organization as well as holding a position as a Masul of the domestic work department.[iv]  In his 1981 speech in Kansas City, he was asked questions about front organizations and he offered the following views on the use of fronts, their existence and the issue of secrecy in organizations:
Zeid al-Noman:   I just want to know if he means the Group which issues Al-Muslim magazine. Yes? Yes. So, my brother, it is a front ..., it is a political front which was set up by the Libyan brothers in order to be able to move through it and issue Al-Muslim magazine. Yes, this front is overseen by brothers from the Ikhwans, They are, I mean, they're from Libya and their native country was Libya. They are associated with the Group and they're affiliated with the Group. And the Group directs the path of this group and this ..., or this front through the presence of the adherent Libyan brothers in the Movement and who work in this front.

Unidentified Male Questioner: What is your opinion regarding the formation of one or multiple fronts for the Group without having the base which represents the Ikhwans, meaning distributing the efforts of the brothers who are the Group without a base in order to stay ahead of the events.

Zeid al-Noman: By God, fronts are one method ...., one method for grouping and are one method to communicate the Ikhwan's thought. They are one method to communicate the Ikhwan's point of view. A front is not formed until after a study and after an exhaustive study. I mean, the last front formed by the Group is the Islamic Association for Palestine.

Zeid al-Noman:  As for distributing the brothers' efforts, yes, in some of the regions where few Ikhwans exist, there will really be a heavy pressure on them because, in addition to that, they have to be members of the MSA, The [Muslim Arab Youth] Association and, if they're Palestinians for instance, they will have to be members in the Islamic Association for Palestine. Yes, it is correct, this would place additional burdens or weight on the brother.

Unidentified Male Questioner:  There is a question which we will ask ..., I mean, we will ask them individually as none of them relate to the other. The resources and freedoms which are available in North America are bigger than what is available in the Islamic world. Despite that, organizational work methods have not changed.

Zeid al-Noman: By God, I believe that the methods are different. If the asking brother is from Iraq, he would know that it is impossible to have such a gathering in Iraq and this is one of the methods. If the asking brother is from Jordan, for instance, he would know that it is not possible to have military training in Jordan, for instance, while here in America, there is weapons training in many of the Ikhwans' camps. Er ...., if the brother is from Libya, he would know that the Islamic Movement has not been able to form due to the pressure which is on the ..., on the people, but it succeeded in growing in America. Our methods, Ikhwans, then are different then even though we might use the same concepts. I mean, we resort to secrecy but the secrecy at our end might take a position that is different from what is in the Orient, for instance. Secrecy over there might be absolute. It might be absolute even among the ranks of the Group. For instance, until now, most of the movements do not know who is the General Masul of the movement when he is among their ranks and neither do they know who are members of the executive office or who is the Masul of the Organization Office, who is the Masul of the Financial Office and so forth. Over here, the brothers know who are the Group's General Masul. Most of the Ikhwans know who is the Masul of the Organization Office. Most of the Naquibs know who are the members of the Executive Office and so on. This means that there is a change in the means. And so on, we can now ..., speak about the fronts, for instance. For instance, the brothers in Egypt don't have fronts in the same broad way we have in America and the fronts are one of the means and so on. Then, Ikhwans, our means are really different. They might carry the same name but the content is different. (Emphasis added)

With respect to carrying out military and security training at Muslim Brotherhood camps, Zeid al-Noman in the same presentation makes the following observations:

Unidentified Male: By "Securing the Group", do you mean military securing? And, if it is that, would you explain to us a little bit the means to achieve it.

Zeid al-Noman: No. Military work is listed under "Special work". "Special work" means military work.  "Securing the Group" is the Groups' security, the Group's security against outside dangers. For instance, to monitor the suspicious movements on the...., which exist on the American front such as Zionism, Masonry ....etc. Monitoring the suspicious movements or the sides, the government bodies such as the CIA, FBI...etc, so that we find out if they are monitoring us, are we not being monitored, how can we get rid of them. That's what is meant by "Securing the Group".

Unidentified Male: You mentioned that there is a weapons training at the Ikhwans' camps but I did not see that at  all in the mid-southern region camps. So, would you explain to us the reasons.

Zeid al-Noman: By God, the first thing is that you thank God and praise him because you found a camp to meet in. You know that, for instance, Oklahoma has become a blocked area for you. You cannot meet in it in the first place, right? Then, the nature.. .. What? [Unintelligible talk from the audience] Yes, I'm sorry. I thought ..., Ok. My brothers, according to what we learned ...,to what I learned, in Oklahoma they started to be strict about letting Muslims use the camps. They would ask them, for instance, to submit their name and they would ask you to bring an ID or something to prove your name. I learned that they were going on a picnic recently, a trip, and the police came asking each person to give ..., to present a...,er, to show his ID or even his visa. These harassments exist then in the state of Oklahoma, for instance. And these are among the reasons which made our brothers in the reason to have their camp here in Missouri. Right, my brother? Then, the circumstances which a region goes through are the ones which determine. In some of the regions when they go to a camp, they take two things, they would request a camp which has a range, a shooting range and one which has a range to shoot, one which has a range which they use for shooting. You would find that in some of the camps. They would get an advance permit for that. I mean, I don't know the possibility of having these camps here and also whether the pressure which exists in Oklahoma ...., and whether they will have a weapons training in the other regions ...., these harassments might continue, I mean, become contagious to the other regions. (Emphasis added)
Mohamed Akram, in the Explanatory Memorandum On the General Strategic Goal for the Group In North America also make the observation that Islamic Centres set up by the Muslim Brotherhood must be the axis of their work as well as the base.  Mr. Akram, also known as Mohamed Akram al-Adlouni was on the initial board of directors of the United Association of Studies and Research (UASR), a HAMAS front that was based in Northern Virginia from approximately 1991 through 2004. UASR, an unindicted co-conspirator in the HLF case, was headed by Ahmed Yousef who now serves as political advisor to head of HAMAS in Gaza, Ismail Haniya.[v]
In the memorandum, the following observations on Islamic Centres run by the Muslim Brotherhood are made:
17-  Understanding the role and the nature of work of "The Islamic Center" in every city with what achieves the goal of the process of settlement:
The center we seek is the one which constitutes the "axis" of our Movement, the "perimeter" of the circle of our work, our "balance center", the "base" for our rise and our "Dar al-Arqam" to educate us, prepare us and supply our battalions in addition to being the "niche" of our prayers.

This is in order for the Islamic center to turn - in action not in words - into a seed "for a small Islamic society" which is a reflection and a mirror to our central organizations. The center ought to turn into a "beehive" which produces sweet honey. Thus, the Islamic center would turn into a place for study, family, battalion, course, seminar, visit, sport, school, social club, women gathering, kindergarten for male and female youngsters, the office of the domestic political resolution, and the center for distributing our newspapers, magazines, books and our audio and visual tapes. In brief we say: we would like for the Islamic center to become "The House of Dawa'" and "the general center" in deeds first before name. As much as we own and direct these centers at the continent level, we can say we are marching successfully towards the settlement of Dawa' in this country. Meaning that the "center's" role should be the same as the "mosque's" role during the time of God's prophet, God's prayers and peace be upon him, when he arched to "settle" the Dawa' in its first generation in Madina. From the mosque, he drew the Islamic life and provided to the world the most magnificent and fabulous civilization humanity knew. This mandates that, eventually, the region, the branch and the Usra turn into "operations rooms" for planning, direction, monitoring and leadership for the Islamic center in order to be a role model to be followed.

In a 1998 memo written by the FBI, similar observations were made about the adherent organizations of the Muslim Brotherhood in North America.  According to this memo, which was written as part of larger investigation, the Muslim Brotherhood had developed “to the point where it has set up political action front groups with no traceable ties to the IIIT or its various Muslim groups." They also have claimed success in infiltrating the United States Government with sympathetic of (sic) compromised individuals."[vi]

15.  The Policy of Denying Affiliation or Denial of Facts

                A.  The Muslim American Society 
                B.  Dr. Mohamed Nekili
                C.  ISNA Canada and Saudi Funding
                D.  The Killing of Ismail Faruqi

A. The Muslim American Society – A Case Study in Denial
The Muslim American Society (MAS) and its relationship to the Muslim Brotherhood is typical of the policy of denial used within this and other adherent organizations. The case of the MAS, founded in 1993, is interesting for the wide range of views which range from absolute denial to absolute agreement by its own members.  Most telling, perhaps is the high degree of ambiguity offered by leadership figures when directly asked about the relationship.
Among the more interesting statements offered on the relationship of the MAS to the Muslim Brotherhood are the following:
a. Everyone knows that MAS is the Muslim Brotherhood
Testifying under oath in criminal court in 2012, Abdurrahman Alamoudi stated that everyone knew the MAS was formed as a Muslin Brotherhood organization and retained that role today. He was testifying as part of a 2004 guilty plea that related to illegal transactions with Libya and attempting to assist a plot to kill then-Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah.  Alamoudi was formerly the head of the American Muslim Council and had bi-partisan influence and had contact with White House officials before his arrest.[vii]
b. The MAS is actually the Muslim Brotherhood
Dr. Mamdouh Mohamed, the Education Advisor the American Open University[viii] stated in 2008 that the MAS is actually the Muslin Brotherhood. There is a YouTube video of this statement.[ix] 
c. MAS has no affiliation with the Ikhwan al Muslimoon (Muslim Brotherhood or the Ikhwan) or with any other international organization.
According to the website of the MAS, they are not a part of the Muslim Brotherhood nor are they affiliated to them in any way.  This statement is in the Frequently Asked Questions part of their site under the question “What is MAS' relationship with the intellectual legacies of other Islamic movements, especially the Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan)?”[x]
d. “The organization was founded by Brotherhood members but has evolved to include Muslims from various backgrounds and ideologies.”
Shaker Elsayed, the secretary-general of the MAS from 2000 to 2005, stated in a 2004 interview that the organization had been founded by the Muslim Brotherhood but that others had since joined the organization.  He also added that the MAS went way beyond that point of conception and that the group has no connection with the Brotherhood and disagrees with the international organization on many issues.[xi]
e. The MAS, like the Brotherhood, believes in the teachings of Brotherhood founder Hassan al-Banna, which are "the closest reflection of how Islam should be in this life."
In the same interview as noted in (d) above, Secretary General Elsayed of the MAS would have us believe that the MAS is no longer a part of the Muslim Brotherhood but yet they follow the teachings of Hssan al-Banna who provides the "the closest reflection of how Islam should be in this life."  This appears to be semantics.  Hassan a-Banna was the founder and long-time head of the organization and his words and deeds are revered by the organization.  To say that you closely follow the teachings of Hassan al-Banna but are not “Brotherhood” is like saying you closely following the teachings of Karl Marx but are not a socialist.
f. "I understand that some of our members may say, `Yes, we are Ikhwan,'" Elsayed says. But, he says, MAS is not administered from Egypt. He adds, "We are not your typical Ikhwan."
This statement by Elsayed appears to be a further game of semantics.  He agrees that some MAS members may state they are Ikhwan (Muslim Brotherhood) but that because they are not administered from Egypt (home of the Muslin Brotherhood) they are not “typical” Muslin Brotherhood.  He appears to be trying to create distance between the MAS and the Muslim Brotherhood. However, as noted elsewhere in this document, the creation of local organizations which are not administered by the central HQ appears to be consistent the general workings of the Muslim Brotherhoods and its adherent organizations.  This is noted in the bylaws as they were written on the official English language of the Muslim Brotherhood “IkhwanWeb.”  When looking at local organizations it is clear that they have a significant amount of administrative leeway as noted in the bylaws which lay out the view that (Article 51):  
Every branch has the right to develop its own bylaw regulating its activities and consistent with domestic circumstances.”[xii]

g.  Mohamed Habib, a high-ranking Brotherhood official in Cairo.  "I don't want to say MAS is an Ikhwan entity," he says. "This causes some security inconveniences for them in a post-Sept. 11 world."

Dr. Mohamed Habib is a senior Muslim Brotherhood figure in Egypt. The IkhwanWeb, which is the Muslin Brotherhood’s official English language website has described him as the Muslim Brotherhood’s Deputy Leader.  As such, his words carry weight.  His non-denial of whether the MAS is a Muslim Brotherhood organization appears to be a part of the “non-denial denial” game of semantics which is common when dealing this subject.  He clearly does not say that the MAS is NOT a Muslim Brotherhood organization.[xiii]

h. Three MAS founders sat on its Board of Directors of the US Muslim Brotherhood
When the MAS was formed in 1993, three of its founding Board of Directors members were also senior officials of the Muslim Brotherhood at that time.  These were Jamal Badawi, Ahmad Elkadi and Omar Soubani. Each of them was identified in a 1992 directory that listed all of the senior members of the Muslim Brotherhood in the USA and Canada at that time.[xiv]  Of particular note is Dr. Jamal Badawi, a senior Canadian figure in the Muslim Brotherhood who has been one of its most significant leaders from the outset of North American operations (see his biography elsewhere in this document).
i. A former U.S. Muslim Brotherhood member Mustafa Saied, stated that the decision to establish MAS was made after a meeting where he and 40 other members debated how openly the Brotherhood should operate in the U.S.
According to former Muslim Brotherhood figure Mustafa Saied, the MAS was formed in 1993 as the result of a meeting with about 40 Muslim Brotherhood members.  There as considerable discussion at this meeting about the relative merits of secrecy and whether or not they should go public with a Muslim Brotherhood organization.  Many members, he said, preferred secrecy, particularly in case U.S. authorities cracked down on Hamas supporters, including many Brotherhood members.[xv]

j. The “MAS was founded as the overt arm of the Muslim Brotherhood in America” and that the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) and MAS “omit reference to a shared background that limits their membership to those of a particular political bent, and undercuts their credibility.”
In the court case of UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SABRl BENKAHLA Defendant-Appellant, the following was submitted to the court.  It notes that the MAS was founded as the overt arm of the Muslim Brotherhood along with CAIR USA:

13.  In describing themselves, Amici Brief at l, CAIR and MAS omit reference to a shared background that limits their membership to those of a particular political bent, and undercuts their credibility. The Muslim Brotherhood is a generally covert international organization whose credo is "Allah is our goal: the Qur'an is our constitution: the Prophet is our leader: Struggle is our way: and death in the path of Allah is our highest aspiration. See. e.g.. Efraim Karsh. Islamic Imperialism, 208-09 (Yale University Press 2006).

MAS was founded as the overt arm of the Muslim Brotherhood in America. See, e.g. Noreen S. Almed-Ullah, Sam Roe and Laurie Cohen, The new face of the Muslim Brotherhood – The Muslim American Socieity, CHI.TRIB., Sep. 19, 2004, available at\news/specials/chi-0409190261sep19,1, 78701 50print.story?coll=chi-newsspecials-hed&ctrack=1&cset+true.

Moreover, from its founding by Muslim Brotherhood leaders, CAIR conspired with other affiliates of the Muslim Brotherhood to support terrorists. See Government's Memorandum in Opposition to CAIR's Motion for Leave to File a Brief. etc.. in United States v Holy Land Foundation … et al, Cr. No 3-04-cr-240-G (N.D. Tx. September 4, 2007): available at  Proof that the conspirators agreed to use deception to conceal from the American public their connections to terrorists was introduced at both the Texas trial in 2007 and also at a Chicago trial the previous year. United States v. Ashqar, et al., No. 03-978 (N.D. 111.2006).[xvi]

k.  The MAS is “It is a self-explanatory name that does not need further explanation.”
The MAS and other Muslim Brotherhood organizations use denial and obfuscation as a tactic.  This is a matter of policy in the MAS. In 2004, the following was published by the Chicago Tribune:
An undated internal memo instructed MAS leaders on how to deal with inquiries about the new organization. If asked, "Are you the Muslim Brothers?" leaders should respond that they are an independent group called the Muslim American Society. "It is a self-explanatory name that does not need further explanation."[xvii]
B.  Dr. Mohamed Nekili
In 2013, Dr. Nekili wrote an article with the title AN OPEN LETTER TO MUSLIM AND ARAB INTELLECTUALS AND LEADERS SUPPORTING THE MILITARY COUP IN EGYPT[xviii] for the blog “For a Free Egypt.”[xix]  The article[xx] is a vigorous defence of the Muslim Brotherhood and it role as the government of Egypt from 2012-2013.  Interestingly enough, in the middle of the article he breaks the flow of his arguments and inserts this line:
I have personally never been organically linked to the international Muslim Brotherhood (MB) nor had I any ties with the Algerian FIS… (Underlining added)
Dr.  Nekili would have us believe that he has never been “organically linked to the International Muslim Brotherhood.”  However, this would seem to be incorrect.  In January of 1993, Wael Haddara (later to be an official advisor to the Muslim Brotherhood President of Egypt), reported him as being the contact person for the Muslim Students Association at the University of Montreal’s “AEMUMEA, Association des Etudiant(e) Musulman(e)s de l'Universite de Montreal & Ecoles Affiliees.  Wael Haddara was, at that time in 1992/1993, compiling a list of individuals who were the contract points for the MSA (Muslin Students Association of the USA and Canada).  Dr Nekili, at that time a student, was listed as “Mohamed Nekili, Phone number 738-5091 > 8 p.m. E-mail:, Current Until  : March 1993.”
As noted elsewhere, the MSA was created as a front organization and recruiting ground for the Muslim Brotherhood in North America.
Later in 2004, he would be publicly identified as a media contact for the Canadian Islamic Congress along with Dr. Mohamed Elmasry and Mrs. Wahida Valiante.  He was listed as:  For French media: Dr. Mohamed Nekili, (519) 885-8140, e-mail:[xxi]   In 2005, he would be listed again as a media contact for the Canadian Islamic Congress as “FOR FRENCH MEDIA: Dr. Mohamed Nekili (514) 745-1255 e-mail: .”[xxii]
In November 2007, the website Jewish Info News ( wrote an article critical of Dr. Jamal Badawi[xxiii], one of the most significant figures in the Muslim Brotherhood in North America.  The article drew comments making a denial that Dr. Badawi could make the comments which were reported on the website.  One of these was made by a “Mohamed Nekili (Canada)” on January 12, 2008 @ 22:33 and he makes the following observation that:
“Only an authenticated transcript of Dr. Badawi’s speech would be worth commenting!  Over the years, we have known Dr. Badawi’s moral integrity and great sense of objectivity and restraint from emotional speech.”[xxiv]
Whatever the reality of the comments made by Dr Badawi, it is interesting to note that the response is simply one of denial, again consistent with the overall approach of the Muslim Brotherhood.

C.  The ISNA and Saudi Funding
The ISNA in North America was created by the Muslim Brotherhood and it has maintained a significant role in the capacity since its creation.  In 2004, Secretary-General Sayyid M. Sayeed of the ISNA told the New York Times that “his group once accepted money from Muslims overseas but had not for the last two or three years. Dr. Syeed said he was confident that the only overseas Muslims who sent money to the Islamic Society were people who supported the moderate vision that he said his group represented.”[xxv]
The Canadian Chapter of the ISNA has a series of charities operated out of its main building at 2200 South Sheridan Way, Mississauga Ontario, L5J 2M3.  These charities are:
1. The Islamic Society of North America; Charity number 118971886RR0001registered in 1983 and website listed as
2.  ISLAMIC SCHOOLS ASSOCIATION OF CANADA (ISAC): Charity number - 892613662RR0001 registered in 1996, website listed as ISNACANADA.COM
3.   The Canadian Islamic Trust Foundation:  Charity number 125104976RR0001 registered in 1988.
4.  ISNA Development Foundation:  Charity number- 863919262RR0001 – status as a charity revoked in 2013 for cause (terrorism funding).
One of these charities (ISNA- Development Foundation) had its charity status revoked in 2013 for using charitable funds to support terrorism according to the official statement from the Government of Canada.[xxvi]
The Islamic Centre of Canada is part of the ISNA[xxvii] and is also co-located with them at their main building on 2200 South Sheridan Way, Mississauga Ontario, L5J 2M3. When interviewed for a 2004 article on the Saudi finding of institutions in Canada, the centre denied receiving any Saudi funding.[xxviii]
However, it was later revealed that in 2002 the Saudi Ministry of Culture and Information had noted that the Kind of Saudi Arabia (Fahd) had given the centre a  $5-million (U.S.)  one time grant and then an annual grant of $1.5-million.
Katherine Bullock, an Australian convert, author/editor[xxix] and a spokesperson for the ISNA  stated that the centre had received funding from the Islamic Development Bank and then later denied this in an email to the same journalist.   Ironically, the ISNA’s own website stated that the funding had in fact occurred.[xxx]
In 2005, ISNA also received as $275,000 grant for their co-located high school as well as money for a scholarship program.[xxxi]
As such, it would appear that statements by the ISNA (USA) and its Canadian chapter are both false and the ISNA has received significant funding from the Saudi government.
D.  The Killing of Ismail Faruqi (co-founder of the Islamic Institute of International Thought-IIIT)
Ismail Faruqi remains a major figure in Muslim Brotherhood circles.  He was a governor/mayor in Palestine (British Mandate – district of Galilee), left the area after the founding of Israel and eventually moved to Montreal, Canada in 1958.  He would later move to the USA and would be well known for his books and his co-founding of the IIIT in 1980/81.  His major intellectual contribution was the concept of the Islamization of Knowledge.  The IIIT, which he co-founded, bears the motto: Towards Islamization of Knowledge and Reform of Islamic Thought.[xxxii]
In 1986, Dr. Faruqi was murdered in his own home by a member of the Muslim community of Philadelphia. However, in 2014, the website of the Islamic Institute of International Thought still has a denial in place concerning the murder of 18 years ago.  The IIIT statement says he was murdered under circumstances that have not been resolved.  The website’s biographical statement on him reads:
Professor Ismail Raji al Faruqi was a co-founder of International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT) and Association of Muslim Social Scientists (AMSS). He was also the founder of the Islamic Studies program in the Department of Religion at Temple University. A distinguished scholar of Islam and comparative religions, trained at Indiana University and McGill University, Professor Faruqi authored, with his wife Dr. Lamya al Faruqi – a distinguished scholar of Islamic art – the seminal work titled The Cultural Atlas of Islam. His book on Christian Ethics was only one of many outstanding books and publications that spoke of his command of the subject. Ismail and Lamya were both murdered in their home in Philadelphia on May 26, 1987 in circumstances that have never been resolved.[xxxiii] (Emphasis added)
The reality is that the circumstances were rather clear.  Dr. Faruqi and his wife were brutally murdered in their own home as a result of a knife attack carried out by Joseph L. Young (aka Yusuf Abdul Ali). Their pregnant daughter was also attacked and required some 200 stitches to close her wounds.
At the time of the attacks, a number of newspapers and magazines around the world[xxxiv] ran stories on the murder suggesting that the couple were political victims and the murder was a Zionist plot, a CIA killing and a variety of other conspiracies.  Mr. Young/Ali attempted an insanity defence, but this was denied by the court.  He confessed to the killing which was confirmed by physical evidence.[xxxv]
The entire affair turned out to be an embarrassment for the Muslim Brotherhood/IIIT community.  During the investigation, trial and eventual confession, Mr. Young/Mr. Ali claimed that though he was a convert to Islam, he was poorly treated.  He also made a series of accusations against the couple (likely false) by which he attempted to justify his killing.[xxxvi]
As such, the circumstances are quite clear, but the stories that circulated that the couple were the victims of a political plot were completely false.

16.  Canadians Listed in the 1992 Directory of the Muslim Brotherhood/Philadelphia Meeting

As a result of the Holy Land Foundation investigation in the USA, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) executed a search warrant on the home of Ismail Elbarrasse.  This individual was an unindicted co-conspirator in the investigation and he was also a former assistant to HAMAS leader Musa Abu Marzook.  At the trial, FBI agent Lara Burns testified that a phone directory[xxxvii] was found at his house.[xxxviii]  This directory listed the names and phone numbers as well as positions of the entire senior leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood in North America.  There were five Canadian phone numbers in the directory which are listed below.

Phone Number

Masul of  the
office for Canada

H: (514) 683-3418
0: (514) 381-9205

 A. Assafiri 

H: (819) 372-3321 as of 1992

Y. Al-Sherida 


H: (403) 490-0146
0: (403) 463-5063

R. Beshir
Masul of a Section or Committee:  Educational
Also on the page that lists the members of the Board of Directors

H: (613) 728-3999
0: (613) 765-2406

Jamal Badawi
Name appears on page listed as Board of Directors

H:  902-445-2494
FAX: 902-445-2494

Additional Canadian Number Listed
As a result of the Holy Land Foundation, the FBI also entered into court a document that had the names and numbers of important phone and fax numbers for the Palestine Section/America.  Mr. Sharawi was listed as number 29 with the phone number 416-391-0324.  He also attended the now infamous “Philadelphia Meeting” where a series of Muslim Brotherhood members from the Islamic Association for Palestine (and others) met to discuss their response to the Oslo Accords which they vehemently opposed.  Mr. Sharawi attended the meeting and is identified as being “AY” in the transcripts.[xxxix]

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